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I. INTRODUCTION
There are two main questions presented in this appeal. The first question is the priority
of deeds of trust held by Appellant Liberty Bankers Life Insurance Company ("Liberty") and
Respondent Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenpo1i & Toole, P.S. ("WKDT") to Blocks A, D, and E of
Post Falls Landing. Post Falls Landing is a real estate development once owned by The Point at
Post Falls, LLC ("The Point"). According to the district court, priority to Blocks A, D, and E
between Liberty and WKDT turns on the enforceability of a loan modification agreement
between Liberty and The Point-the Eighth Modification Agreement (the "Eighth Agreement").
Up until the execution of the Eighth Agreement, it is undisputed that Liberty's original deed of
trust on the Post Falls Landing property maintained priority over WKDT's deed oftrust.
Under the Eighth Agreement, Liberty and The Point agreed to modify Liberty's existing
loan to The Point by splitting the loan into two loans. The agreement required The Point to
provide a new deed of trust on Blocks A, D, and E as security for one of the loans, and upon
receipt and recordation, Liberty agreed to release the parcels from its original deed of trust. All
material terms of The Point's existing loan, including the total principal amount and the security,
remained the same. Blocks A, D, and E, however, were never released from Liberty's original
deed of trust, and a separate deed of trust encumbering the parcels and a release of lien were
never recorded. Liberty later acquired the Post Falls Landing property (including Blocks A, D,
and E) at a trustee's sale held under its original deed of trust in November 2012.
The district court nevertheless ruled that Liberty lost its priority to Blocks A, D, and E.
According to the district court, the Eighth Agreement was enforceable under the doctrine of
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judicial estoppel and, as a result, the agreement effectively released Blocks A, D, and E from
Liberty's original deed of trust and secured the parcels under a separate deed of trust. From
there, the district court held WKDT agreed to subordinate its deed of trust to Liberty's original
deed of trust but not a new, separate deed of trust on Blocks A, D, and E, and thus WKDT's deed
of trust had priority to the parcels. The district court also held that Liberty's foreclosure of the
parcels did not affect WKDT' s senior lien.
The district court's ruling, and WKDT's entire position on appeal, presumes the Eighth
Agreement is enforceable by WKDT and that the agreement released Blocks A, D, and E from
Liberty's original deed of trust and secured the parcels under a separate deed of trust. A careful
reading ofWKDT's response brief shows that it has cited little, if any, authority to support its
contentions. In contrast, in its opening appeal brief, Liberty explained that WKDT, a complete
stranger to the Eighth Agreement, cannot enforce the agreement as a third-party beneficiary.
Moreover, even if WKDT could, judicial estoppel cannot render the agreement enforceable and
performed based on the record before the Court. The trial record simply does not support a
finding that Liberty made inconsistent statements to its advantage in another judicial proceeding.
· But Liberty also explained that the district court's error goes deeper--even if judicial
estoppel is applicable here and the Eighth Agreement is enforceable against Liberty, Liberty still
did not lose its priority under Idaho law. That is because Blocks A, D, and E were never released
from Liberty's original deed of trust, and simply restructuring The Point's loan did not destroy
the priority of Liberty's lien when WKDT suffered no injury. As a result, Liberty's original deed
of trust controls priority to Blocks A, D, and E. Alternatively, any rights WKDT may have had
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to the parcels were extinguished by Liberty's foreclosure. In this reply brief, Liberty addresses
those issues first, because any one of them controls the question of priority to Blocks A, D, and
E. Only then does Liberty turn to the issues of third-party beneficiary and judicial estoppel.
Finally, the second question on appeal is who, between Liberty and WKDT, holds
priority to the Post Falls Landing Marina. The district court ruled that WKDT has a perfected
security interest in the marina because the marina's facilities and improvements are personal
property, not a fixture. The district court reached that ruling by error, because it improperly
weighed the subjective intent of the marina's installer and his frame of mind at the time of
installation. Idaho law teaches that the district court should instead consider objective intent.
Liberty cannot be bound by the installer's actual intent, only inferences drawn by the
surrounding circumstances. Finding otherwise, the district court erred as a matter of law.
As explained further below, the Court should reverse the district court's judgment on the
questions of priority to Blocks A, D, and E and to the Post Falls Landing Marina.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
WKDT' s statement of facts contains argument and requires correction on a number of
points to ensure the facts stated on appeal are consistent with the record before the district court
and now this Court. 1 Of note, WKDT mischaracterizes both the record on and the legal effect of
the consent order Liberty entered into with the State of Florida's Office oflnsurance Regulation
1 WKDT's

statement of facts also includes a section titled "Why the Eighth LMA
Matters." See Respondent's Brief ("RB") at 18-20. In it, WKDT argues "[t]he Eighth LMA
significantly modified the relative rights of Liberty and Witherspoon in the following respects."
Id. at 18. Liberty addresses those arguments in Section III of this reply brief.
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in September 2007. As Liberty discussed in its opening brief, the consent order addressed
Liberty's compliance with Florida's minimum capital and surplus requirements. See AB at 11
(citing Ex. PP). 2 The consent order was not entered as part of a judicial proceeding. See Ex. PP.
According to the consent order, the Office of Insurance Regulation suspended Liberty
from doing business in Florida for failing to comply with those requirements. Ex. PP at 3-4. To
be reinstated, Liberty agreed that it would limit new construction loans to ".25% of admitted
assets secured in any one construction loan and 2% of admitted assets in the aggregate." Id. at 5
(,I 4(f)). At trial, evidence regarding the consent order was limited to the order itself (Ex. PP),

the testimony of Bradford Phillips (Liberty's president), and two emails that reference the
Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (Exs. KK, MM). 3
From that evidence, WKDT greatly overstates the reach of the consent order and the
representations Liberty made to the Florida Office oflnsurance Regulation regarding The Point's
loan. According to WKDT, Liberty entered into the Eighth Agreement "[i]n order to obtain

2

Liberty's opening Appellant's Brief is cited as "AB." The Clerk's Record is cited as
"R.Vol.1" for volume 1, "R.Vol.2;, for volume 2, and so on. The Reporter's Transcript is
composed of two unlabeled volumes. The larger transcript (of 287 pages) includes the transcript
from trial and is cited as "Tr.Vol.I." The deposition transcript of Harry Green, which was
admitted at trial as Court Ex. 1, is cited as "Green Depo." Trial exhibits are cited as "Ex."
3 No

testimony from a representative of the Office of Insurance Regulation was presented
at trial. Also, WKDT' s counsel used two documents apparently related to the Office of
Insurance Regulation to refresh Mr. Phillip's recollection, but those documents were not
admitted as exhibits. See Tr.Vol.1 at 121:6-127:18, 142:19-144:24, 204:16-205:7.
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compliance with the terms of the Consent Order."4 RB at 12. WKDT also states that in
February 2011, Liberty "advised the State of Florida that Liberty had reached an agreement with
The Point to modify The Point's loan to create separate 'construction' and 'non-construction'
loans." 5 Id. at 12. And: "[A]fter representing to the State of Florida that the Eighth
[Agreement] had been executed to achieve compliance with the terms of the Consent Order,
Liberty proceeded to re-notice its Trustee's sale under the Seventh [Agreement]." Id. at 16. The
trial record simply does not support those statements.
In the consent order, there is no mention of Liberty's loan to The Point. Ex. PP at 3-7.
When Liberty entered into the consent order in September 2007, the outstanding principle on
The Point's loan stood at approximately $5.5 million. Ex. Y. Thereafter, the amount of the loan
was increased and the term extended through four loan modifications, eventually increasing the
loan to $9,290,000 in April 2010 under the Seventh Loan Modification Agreement (the "Seventh
Agreement") to cover unpaid interest, taxes, and various fees. See Ex. 22 at 2; see also Exs. Z,
AA, BB, CC. At trial, Mr. Phillips explained that the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation

4

Similarly, \VKDT states: "Compliance with the tem1s of the Consent Order was had
solely because of the Eighth [Agreement]." RB at 14 n.6.
5

In addition, WKDT states: "Liberty advised the State of Florida, in February of 2011
that The Point loan had in fact been segregated even though no such agreement had been made
with The Po1nt." RB at 14 n.6 (citing Tr.Vol.l at 123, 127, and 133). Also: "Phillips provided
the State of Florida with information representing that Liberty's $9.29 million loan to The Point
had in fact been broken out into a $2.54 million construction loan and a $6.75 million nonconstruction loan, consistent with the terms of the Eighth [Agreement]." Id. at 14 (citing
Tr.Vol.1 at 144:4-12).
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never demanded that Liberty formally segregate The Point's loan, Tr.Vol.I at 153: 1-5, and no
evidence suggests otherwise.
Mr. Phillips also explained how the consent order related to The Point's promissory note
and the Eighth Agreement. His testimony shows that the consent order lead Liberty to break out
or segregate The Point's loan into its construction and non-construction components for the
purposes of reporting Liberty's assets to the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation. Id. at
121:6-17, 123:15-20, 126:2-127:18, 143:1-144:12. Mr. Phillips also explained that the Office of
Insurance Regulation approved reporting in that manner, id. at 152:16-153:5, 154:5-155:12, but
he feared how "some of the folks at the Florida Insurance Department might later characterize
this loan," id. at 128: 17-25; see also Ex. KK. To put that concern to rest, Liberty proposed the
Eighth Agreement. Tr.Vol.I at 119:2-120:24, 139:5-8, 155:20-156:2.
Thus, contrary to WKDT's repeated statements, the record does not establish that Liberty
would be in breach or non-compliance of the consent order had it not entered into the Eighth
Agreement. Nothing in the record shows that the Florida Office oflnsurance Regulation
required Liberty to enter into the Eighth Agreement or even knew how Liberty's loan to The
Point was formally characterized-as a construction loan or non-construction loan-under the
Seventh Agreement or Eighth Agreement. To be sure, WKDT's statements that Liberty reported
and advised the State of Florida that The Point's loan was modified to achieve compliance with
the consent order (in February 2011 or any other time) are not supported by the trial record.
Rather, the trial record shows Liberty prepared and reported schedules to the Office of Insurance
Regulation that segregated the loan into its construction and non-construction components for
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reporting purposes, but Libe1iy did not inform the agency that it reached any agreement with the
Point to do so. Id. at 120:25-127:22, 143:1-144:12.
Another area of WKDT's statement of facts that requires correction is the supposition
that Liberty loaned funds to The Point to develop the Post Falls Landing Marina as an
afterthought. As told by WKDT, Liberty and The Point first modified their loan agreement in
February 2007 to provide additional financing for the development of the two condominium
buildings, Pier 20 on the Boardwalk and Pier 21 on the Boardwalk, along the Spokane River.
RB at 8. WKDT states, "Under the initial modification, Liberty neither committed to fund, nor
did it require construction of, any marina facilities." Id. Also, "Liberty funded the construction
of the marina improvements after funding construction of the two (2) twenty-unit condominium
complexes and without prior obligation to do so." Id. at 9 (emphasis in original).
The trial record does not support WKDT's recount. The first loan modification between
Liberty and The Point was executed in August 2006 for the express purpose of constructing "a
full service marina facility on the Spokane River in Post Falls, Idaho, which is to be located upon
a part of the Property." Ex. 20 at 1. At that time, The Point and Liberty modified the terms of
the loan, and Liberty advanced an additional $2,200,000. Id. at 1-2. In December 2006, Liberty
advanced The Point an additional $205,087 "for anticipated cost overruns on the Marina
Project." Ex. 21 at 2. Only then, contrary to WKDT's statement of the facts, did Liberty
advance additional funds to The Point for the construction of Pier 20 on the Boardwalk and Pier
21 on the Boardwalk. See generally Exs. X, Y. The Post Falls Landing Marina and the
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condominium buildings were constructed during the same time frame. Tr.Vol.I at 94:1-95:21,
96:9-12, 110:8-24, 228:11-229:13; Green Depo. at 19:4-20:15.
III. REPLY ARGUMENT
A.

Liberty Did Not Lose Its Priority to Blocks A, D, and E Because Its Original Deed of
Trust Remained of Record and a New Deed of Trust on the Parcels Securing The
Point's Existing Debt Would Not Injure WKDT's Junior Lien.

According to the district court, WKDT agreed to subordinate its deed of trust on the Post
Falls Landing property to Liberty's original deed of trust but not a separate deed of trust on
Blocks A, D, and E. R.Vol.6 at 1194. The district court's ruling presumes not only that the
Eighth Agreement is enforceable, but that the agreement released Blocks A, D, and E from
Liberty's original deed of trust and secured the parcels under a separate deed of trust. Id. at
1193. But as Liberty explained in its opening brief, the priority of Liberty and WKDT's deeds of
trust on Blocks A, D, and E does not tum on judicial estoppel or the enforceability of the Eighth
Agreement. AB at 17-28. Rather, based on Idaho recording and priority law, it turns on the
recording date of Liberty's original deed of trust. Id. That is true for two independent reasons.
1.

Because Liberty Never Released Blocks A, D, and E from Its Original Deed
of Trust, It Maintains Priority to the Parcels.

The first reason is that a mortgage recorded first in time has priority against subsequent
lien holders. See Idaho Code§§ 55-811, 55-812. The first in time rule also applies to deeds of
trust. See Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 195, 30 P.3d 970, 973 (2001). Here, WKDT
recorded a deed of trust (Ex. B) in the records of Kootenai County encumbering the Post Falls
Landing property first but, as a condition of Liberty's agreement to make a loan to The Point,
subordinated its lien so that Liberty's recorded deed of trust (Ex. 19) would have priority. See
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Ex. C at 1; Ex. H at 1; see also Exs. K, L, M, 0, Q. It is undisputed that, up until the execution
of the Eighth Agreement, Liberty's original deed of trust maintained first in time priority over
WKDT's deed of trust.
Even if one accepts the district court's conclusion that the Eighth Agreement is
enforceable and required a separate deed of trust encumbering Blocks A, D, and E, the fact
remains that the parcels were not released from Liberty's original deed of trust and a new deed of
trust was not recorded in Kootenai County. See Tr.Vol.1 at 152:5-15. Because the public record
gave notice that Liberty maintained its original deed of trust on the entire Post Falls Landing
property, WKDT's lien on the parcels remains junior under its subordination agreement. See
Idaho Code§§ 55-811, 55-812; Kalange, 136 Idaho at 195, 30 P.3d at 973 ("Constructive notice
imparted from the record ... is a matter of statute."). As Liberty explained in its opening brief,
that remains true even where a subsequent agreement requires the release of a lien but the release
is not recorded. See AB at 19-22 (citing Int 'l Mortg. Bank v. Whitaker, 44 Idaho 178, 185, 255
P. 903,905 (1927); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Kemp, 951 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1992)).
In response, WKDT contends that Liberty's November 2012 foreclosure sale was void
and of no effect under Idaho Code§ 45-1506(4). RB at 32. WKDT also contends Liberty
cannot maintain its priority to Blocks A, D, and E under the recording statutes since it was not a
good-faith purchaser under Idaho Code§ 55-812. 6 Id. at 32-33. But those contentions presume,

Under Idaho Code§ 55-812, "[e]very conveyance ofreal property ... is void as against
any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, or any part thereof, in good faith
and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded." The district court
(continued ... )
6
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conclusively, that WKDT gained priority to the parcels under the Eighth Agreement without
actually addressing the threshold question of priority under Idaho Code§§ 55-811 and 55-812
and its subordination agreements. Thus, WKDT's response arguments address the validity of the
foreclosure sale, not the priority of the parties' deeds of trust under the recording statutes.
WKDT also contends that International Mortgage Bank and Resolution Trust are not
applicable because Liberty specifically agreed to execute a partial release of Blocks A, D, and E
and encumber the parcels with a new deed of trust. RB at 33-35. Again WKDT presumes the
Eighth Agreement was enforceable, but under those decisions, an agreement to release a lien, by
itself, is not sufficient to actually release the lien, and the original recorded mortgage governs
priority. International Mortgage Bank involved an agreement by a bank and two borrowers to
split an existing mortgage into separate mortgages. 44 Idaho at 185,255 P. at 905. Regardless
of the reasons why, the mortgages were not split, and the bank's original mortgage remained of
record and thus controlled priority. Id. That is the case here.
As for Resolution Trust, the facts there are very close to this case. As Liberty did here,
the lender in Resolution Trust maintained a superior lien position and agreed to release its deed
of trust in an agreement with the borrower but never did. 951 F .2d at 661-62. Even so, the
lender's recorded deed of trust controlled priority. Id. It follows that Liberty's original deed of

(... continued)
did not address the validity of the foreclosure sale and the effect of section 55-812 on Liberty's
purchase of Blocks A, D, and E. See R.Vol.6 at 1191-96. Also, as explained later, Liberty's
subsequent purchase of the parcels at the foreclosure sale was proper and extinguished any rights
WKDT may have had to Blocks A, D, and E.
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trust controls priority to Blocks A, D, and E under Idaho's recording statutes, not the Eighth
Agreement. Liberty's original deed of trust remained of record in Kootenai County, as did
WKDT's subordination agreement, establishing Liberty's priority to the parcels. The district
court erred when it ignored the priority afforded Liberty's original deed of trust.
2.

Even if the Eighth Agreement Was Performed, Restructuring The Point's
Notes and Taking a New Deed of Trust on Blocks A, D, and E Would Not
Operate to Release Liberty's Original Lien.

Even assuming the Eighth Agreement was enforceable and fully performed and Liberty
secured Blocks A, D, and E under a new, separate deed of trust, Liberty would still maintain its
priority through its original deed of trust. Longstanding Idaho law holds that substituting or
restructuring an underlying debt and mortgage does not destroy the recorded lien's priority
unless that was the parties' intent. See, e.g., W Loan & Sav. Co. v. Kendrick State Bank, 13
Idaho 331,335, 90 P. 112, 113 (1907) (finding lender's original mortgage maintained priority to
property even though debtor granted lender new mortgage to secure original debt); Smith v.
Thomas, 42 Idaho 375,380,245 P. 399,401 (1926) (holding lien of mortgage secures

indebtedness, not evidence of indebtedness, and change in form of evidence does not operate to
discharge mortgage).
As Liberty explained in its opening brief, Idaho is not alone in that view. See AB at 25
n.4. For example, the Restatement of (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 7.3(a) (1997) states:
If a senior mortgage is released of record and, as part of the same transaction, is replaced
with a new mortgage, the latter mortgage retains the same priority as its predecessor,
except ... to the extent that any change in the terms of the mortgage or the obligation it
secures is materially prejudicial to the holder of a junior interest in the real estate ....
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While this Court has not expressly adopted the Restatement, it has recognized the general
principle to which the Restatement prescribes: the parties to a mortgage may modify the terms of
the loan and retain the priority of the original secured position if the changes do not injure the
interests ofjunior lienholders. See, e.g., Int'l Mortg. Bank, 44 Idaho at 185,255 P. at 905
(finding that intervening lienholder did not change his position and could not demonstrate injury
by modification or continuation of original security); Biersdorff v. Brumfield, 93 Idaho 569, 572,
468 P.2d 301, 304 (1970) (finding that intervening lienholder was "not in the position of a junior
lienholder who is prejudiced because he lent money relying on a limited or stated lien which
gave no warning that it would be expanded in the future."). 7
Under the Idaho decisions cited above and the Restatement, recording a new deed of trust
on Blocks A, D, and E would not change the constructive notice that the recording of the
Liberty's original deed of trust afforded. The records of Kootenai County showed the existence
of Liberty's senior deed of trust on the Post Falls Landing property as security for The Point's
debt of $9,290,000. Exs. 19, 22, Q. Liberty did not make a new loan to The Point nor did The
Point give Liberty new security. Exs. 22, JJ. The principal amount owed under the Seventh
Agreement did not increase and the interest rate and maturity date remained the same. Compare
7

There are other examples as well. See Idaho First Nat 'l Bank v. Wells, I 00 Idaho 256,
260, 596 P.2d 429, 433 (1979) ("[I]f a future advance is obligatory, it takes its priority from the
original date of the mortgage, and the subsequent creditor is junior to it. However, if the advance
is optional, and if the mortgagee has notice when the advance is made that a subsequent creditor
has acquired an interest in the land, then the advance loses its priority to that creditor .... "); Idaho
Code§ 45-116 (stating that priority of lien of mortgage-which "includes deed oftrust"-shall
not be affected by provisions in note or mortgage allowing adjustment of interest rate or increase
in underlying mortgage obligation because of deferment of interest payments).
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Ex. 22 at 2 with Ex. JJ at ,r,r 1-3, 24; see also Tr.Vol.I at 146:20-147:5. Liberty and The Point
did not intend to discharge or reconvey any portion of Liberty's original deed of trust. See Ex. JJ
at ,r,r 13, 15, 18, 24, 25.
Moreover, WKDT cannot claim the modification of Liberty's original deed of trust
injured its junior security interest or its legitimate expectations as a junior lienholder. WKDT
subordinated its priority to Blocks A, D, and E with full knowledge of The Point's outstanding
loan and the scope of Liberty's security in the Post Falls Landing property. See, e.g., Exs. H, Q.
When WKDT first agreed to subordinate its deed of trust, it expressly agreed to subordinate its
lien on the property "to [The Point's] new loan from [Liberty] in an amount not to exceed a
combined principal amount of approximately $9,500,000.00." Ex. Cat 1; see also Tr.Vol.l at
93: 18-25. WKDT reiterated its agreement after Liberty and The Point entered into the Seventh
Agreement to increase the loan to $9,290,000. Ex. Q at 1-2.
Because the amount of the loan and the scope of Liberty's security did not change,
WKDT cannot claim any prejudice when it expressly recognized-both in its first subordination
agreement and in its last-that "specific loans and advances are being and will be made and, as
part and parcel thereof, specific monetary and other obligations are being and will be entered into
which would not be made or entered into but for said reliance on this waiver, relinquishment and
subordination." Ex. H at 1; Ex. Q at 3. WKDT' s argument now that its subordination agreement
no longer extends to Blocks A, D, and E-and the district court's acceptance of it-repudiates
that fundamental agreement.
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To claim prejudice, WKDT's contends it suffered injury because its deed of trust was
senior to Liberty's original deed of trust, see RB at 18-20, and because Liberty improperly
increased the amount of indebtedness secured by its deed of trust, to its advantage, at the
November 2012 trustee's sale, id. at 18. Those contentions again conclusively presume WKDT
had priority to Blocks A, D, and E in the first place, without actually addressing the threshold
question of priority. WKDT's argument is circular and without authority. Under International
Mortgage Bank, Biersdorff, and the principle expressed in the Restatement, any prejudice

suffered by WKDT must derive from some change in The Point's debt that impacted WKDT's
position to that debt. Yet under the Eighth Agreement, WKDT sits in the exact same position to
The Point's loan as it sat under the Seventh Agreement.
In sum, as the senior lienholder, Liberty did not lose its priority through the restructuring

of The Point's existing loan and existing deed of trust when Liberty and The Point did not intend
to change Liberty's priority and WKDT suffered no injury from the restructuring. WKDT's
position was not changed in any way and thus it was not prejudiced by the Eighth Agreement.
WKDT cannot claim injury even if the Eighth Agreement modified Liberty's deed of trust. By
holding otherwise, the district court's judgment constitutes reversible error.
B.

Liberty's November 2012 Foreclosure of Its Original Deed of Trust Was Not
Wrongful and Extinguished Any Rights That WKDT Had in Blocks A, D, and E.

Alternatively, the district court also erred in finding Liberty's deed of trust lost its priority
because any rights that WKDT held in the underlying property were extinguished by the trustee's
sale held in November 2012. See AB at 30-35. In response, WKDT continues to argue that the
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trustee's sale failed to comply with Idaho Code § 45-1506 and was thus rendered void as to
WKDT's interest in the property. RB at 27-30. Section 45-1506, however, does not require the
underlying loan agreement or promissory note to be described in the notice of the foreclosure
sale. Rather, the provision requires notice to provide a description of the property covered by the
deed of trust, where the deed of trust is recorded, the default for which the foreclosure is made,
and the sum owing on the underlying obligation. Idaho Code § 45-1506(4). The notice of sale
of the Post Falls Landing property included all of that information. Exs. FF, GG.
But even if the notice of sale was required to describe Parcels A, D, and E apart from the
remainder of the Post Falls Landing property, the trustee's sale was not void under the statute.
WKDT had notice of the Eighth Agreement and only objected to the sale of the Post Falls
Landing Marina, not the sale of Blocks A, D, and E. Tr.Vol.I at 210:24-214:4; Exs. WW, XX,

YY, 37. Thus any rights WKDT had in the property were extinguished by the November 2012
foreclosure. See Idaho Code § 45-1508 ("A sale made by a trustee under this act shall foreclose
and terminate all interest in the property covered by the trust deed of all persons to whom notice
is given under section 45-1506, Idaho Code .... "); First Interstate Bank of Idaho, NA. v.
Eisenbarth, 123 Idaho 895, 898, 853 P.2d 640, 643 (Ct. App. 1993).
C.

WKDT Is Not a Third-Party Beneficiary to the Eighth Agreement and Has No
Right or Standing to Enforce the Agreement.
As explained above, the priority of the deeds of trust held by Liberty and WKDT does

not tum on the enforceability of the Eighth Agreement. Liberty did not and cannot lose its
priority to Blocks A, D, and E based on the Eighth Agreement-an agreement that was never
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performed, that did not change the underlying debt or security, and that did not prejudice
WKDT. As such, the Court need not reach the district court's ruling that Liberty was estopped
from denying the enforceability of the Eighth Agreement. See R.Vol.5 at 1048; see also R.Vol.6
at 1193-94 n. 5. Should the Court address it, however, it will find the district court abused its
discretion by failing to properly apply the governing legal standards.
Even if the enforceability of the Eighth Agreement controls the priority of Liberty and
WKDT' s deeds of trust, the district court erred in allowing WKDT to enforce the agreement.
WKDT was not a party to the Eighth Agreement. See Ex. JJ. In its response brief, WKDT
contends it "was entitled to the benefits of the Eighth [Agreement] ... because the District Court
held Liberty ... was estopped from refusing to perform in accordance with the terms." RB at 39.
That circular and conclusive contention does not conform to Idaho law. WKDT sought to
enforce the Eighth Agreement and the release of Blocks A, D, and E from Liberty's original deed
of trust through the doctrine of judicial estoppel and continues to seek its enforcement on appeal.
See id. at 21-26. Under Idaho law, before a third party can enforce a contract, "'it must be

shown that the contract was made for his direct benefit ... and that it is not sufficient that he be a
mere incidental beneficiary."' Blickenstaff v. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 579, 97 P.3d 439,446
(2004) (citation omitted; ellipsis in original).
WKDT contends it was a third-party beneficiary because the Eighth Agreement
provides that "[t]his Agreement shall be binding upon, and shall inure to the benefit of, the
parties' respective heirs, successors and assigns." RB at 39 (citing Ex. JJ at 121). Such indirect
and incidental references are not sufficient to convey third-party beneficiary status. See Wing v.
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Martin, I 07 Idaho 267, 273, 688 P.2d 1172, 1178 (1984) (finding tenant was not third-party
beneficiary to prior lease that did not refer to future tenants under some future lease but only to
successors or assignees of the specific lease within which the language appears). Moreover,
even assuming WKDT was a heir, successor, or assign to The Point, "[t]he mere mention of a
third party in a contract does not render that party a third-party beneficiary absent a showing that
the contract was made for that party's direct benefit." De Groot v. Standley Trenching, Inc.,_
Idaho_, 338 P.3d 536,541 (2014) (citing Blickenstaff, 140 Idaho at 579, 97 P.3d at 446).
No language in the Eighth Agreement states the agreement was made for WKDT's direct
benefit. See Ex. JJ. Yet the district court allowed WKDT to enforce the Eighth Agreement as a
non-party without considering its third-party beneficiary status. See R.Vol.6 at 1201. The
district court abused its discretion in doing so.
D.

The District Court Erred in Finding the Eighth Agreement Is Enforceable Through
the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel Because Liberty Did Not Take an Inconsistent
Position or Gain an Advantage in Another Judicial Proceeding.
The district court also abused its discretion when it found, on summary judgment, that

Liberty is judicially estopped from denying the enforceability of the Eighth Agreement. The
Court has long recognized what judicial estoppel is designed to address: "a litigant who obtains
a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party through means of sworn statements is
judicially estopped from adopting inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony, to obtain a
recovery or a right against another party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter."

Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 597, 600 (2008). The purpose of judicial
estoppel is "to prevent abuse of the judicial process by deliberate shifting of positions to suit the
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exigencies of a particular action." Id.; see also McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152, 93 7 P.2d
1222, 1226 (1997) (observing judicial estoppel is intended to prevent parties from playing fast
and loose with courts).
Judicial estoppel thus prohibits "a party from assuming a position in one proceeding and
then taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding." A & J Constr. Co. v. Wood,
141 Idaho 682,688, 116 P.3d 12, 18 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For
the doctrine to apply, a party must have taken an inconsistent position at a prior judicial
proceeding. See, e.g., In re Pangburn, 154 Idaho 233,242,296 P.3d 1080, 1089 (2013) (holding
judicial estoppel does not apply to administrative proceedings); see also United States v. Garcia,
37 F.3d 1359, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that under minority and majority views, there
must have existed a prior judicial proceeding at which the party to be judicially estopped took a
contradictory position), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Jackson, 167 F.3d
1280 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, "the party asserting judicial estoppel must show that the sworn
statement at issue was used to obtain a judgment, advantage, or consideration from another
party." Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737,749,215 P.3d
457, 469 (2009).
And therein lies the district court's error-WKDT cannot show Liberty obtained a
judgment, advantage, or consideration from sworn statements made at a prior judicial
proceeding, much less the absence of genuine issues of material fact on the application of
judicial estoppel. According to the district court, Liberty made sworn and inconsistent
statements about the enforceability of the Eighth Agreement in In re The Point at Post Falls,
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L.L.C., Case No. 11-21607-TLM (Bankr. D. Idaho) ("In re The Point") 8 and Liberty Bankers Life

Insurance Co. v. Harry A. Green et al., Case No. CV-2011-10121 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Kootenai
Cnty.) ("Liberty v. Green"). 9 R.Vol.5 at 1047-48; R.Vol.6 at 1273. But the district court did not
find that Liberty gained a judgment, advantage, or consideration from the statements made in
either case. Id. Nor could it based on the record before it. As Liberty explained in its opening
brief, there is no evidence in the summary judgment or trial record to support that Liberty gained
any judgment, advantage, or consideration in those court proceedings. AB at 37-38.

8

In its opening brief, Liberty also explained there is no evidence that it made statements
in In re The Point, the Point's bankruptcy proceeding, that were inconsistent with its position in
this matter. See AB at 36-37. Liberty continues to maintain that stance. According to WKDT,
in that action, Liberty stated under the penalty of perjury that the Eighth Agreement was the
"operative agreement" and "governed." See, e.g., RB at 15-16, 23. Liberty's filings in In re The
Point do not support those contentions. See Exs. VV, XX. Liberty represented-as it did before
the district court and does here-that it had a right to foreclose on its original deed of trust, not
the Eighth Agreement. See id. Liberty attached the Eighth Agreement to its filings as evidence
of The Point's debt and no more. Id. In any event, as noted below, both the district court and
WKDT fail to connect Liberty's so-called inconsistent position in In re The Point with any
advantage it gained in that proceeding, rendering any position Liberty took there of no relevance.
In fact, Liberty obtained none, as the proceeding was dismissed before the bankruptcy court ever
considered Liberty's filings. See RB at 16.
9

Liberty also made no inconsistent statements in Liberty v. Green. Liberty initiated that
action against the guarantors of The Point's promissory note, not The Point. R.Vol.5 at 953-57.
Liberty's sole claim alleged that the guarantors breached their guarantee agreements. Id. As
such, under Liberty's complaint, the Seventh Agreement was not directly at issue. Further the
only evidence before the district court regarding Liberty v. Green was Liberty's complaint and
the district court's decision on The Point's motion to intervene and motion for a preliminary
injunction. See R.Vol.5 at 953-57; R.Vol.3 at 636-59. Those documents do not affirmatively
state what Liberty's position was regarding the Eighth Agreement. See id.
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In its response brief, WKDT necessarily concedes that point, as it does not contend that
Liberty gained any advantage from In re The Point or Liberty v. Green. RB at 24-25. Instead,
WKDT contends Liberty gained advantages from inconsistent positions taken with respect to two
non-judicial proceedings: the consent order entered into with the Florida Office of Insurance
Regulation and the November 2012 trustee's sale of the Post Falls Landing property. 10 Id. As
discussed above in the statement of facts (at pages 3-7), WKDT exaggerates and
mischaracterizes the representations Liberty made to the Office of Insurance Regulation. There
is simply no evidence in the record that Liberty represented to the agency that it entered into the
Eighth Agreement with The Point or that it gained any advantage from such a position.
But WKDT's contention that Liberty gained advantages under the terms of the consent
order and the trustee's sale is more problematic than that, as it exposes the inconsistency of its
argument and the district court's error. As explained above, judicial estoppel only operates to
bind a party to statements made in a prior judicial proceeding and from which it gained an
advantage in that proceeding. But here WKDT effectively concedes that Liberty did not obtain
any advantage from In re The Point or Liberty v. Green but from entirely different non-judicial
proceedings. Neither the Florida consent order nor the trustee's sale was a judicial proceeding
and thus Liberty cannot be judicially estopped from pursuing any alleged inconsistent positions
in those matters. See In re Pangburn, 154 Idaho at 242,296 P.3d at 1089.
As for the trustee's sale, WKDT does not identify any inconsistent position Liberty
took as part of the sale. RB at 25-26. Nor did the district court. See R.Vol.5 at 1047-48;
R.Vol.6 at 1273.
10
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In sum, the Eighth Agreement is not enforceable by judicial estoppel, and Blocks A, D,
and E cannot be released from Liberty's deed of trust through the doctrine. As WKDT
effectively concedes, Liberty did not obtain an advantage in any court proceeding by maintaining
an inconsistent position. The district court abused its discretion in applying judicial estoppel in
the absence of such facts or, at the very least, where there were genuine issues of material facts
as to alleged positions taken by Liberty or the alleged advantage it gained.

E.

In Finding the Post Falls Landing Marina Is Personal Property, the District Court
Erred by Considering Harry Green's Subjective Intent, Rather Than Objective
Intent, in Developing the Marina.
In its opening brief, Liberty explained that the district court also erred as a matter of law

in finding the Post Falls Landing Marina's facilities and improvements were personal property
and not a fixture. AB at 38-43. The district court's error derives from its failure to properly
apply the three-part test to determine whether an item has become a fixture: (1) annexation to
the connected realty; (2) adaptation to the use of the realty; and (3) "'intention to make the article
a permanent accession to the freehold."' Rayl v. Shull Enters., Inc., 108 Idaho 524,527, 700
P.2d 567, 570 (1984) (citation omitted). In particular, the district court improperly considered
the subjective intent of Harry Green, the owner and manager of The Point, to find there was no
intent to permanently install the Post Falls Landing Marina to the adjoining realty. See AB at 4142. Mr. Green and The Point were not parties to this action.
WKDT defends the district court's ruling on intent by pointing to objective evidence,
such as the supposition that Liberty funded the construction of the marina afler it funded the
construction of the Pier 20 on the Boardwalk and Pier 21 on the Boardwalk condominium
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buildings. RB at 41-42. But as Liberty explained at pages 7-8 of this brief, WKDT's statements
are not supported by the record. The first modification to Liberty's loan to The Point funded the
marina; only then did Liberty fund the condominium buildings. See Exs. 20, 21, X, Y. The
remaining objective evidence WKDT cites was colored by the district court's emphasis and
reliance on Mr. Green's actual subjective intent to find none of the marina's facilities and
improvements were permanent. See R.Vol.6 at 1198-1199.
As WKDT itselfrecognizes, the district court "considered Mr. Green's testimony as to
his subjective intentions in the context of Green's description of what had been objectively
constructed on the property." RB at 41 (emphases added). WKDT's acknowledgment
demonstrates the district court's error. "The intention sought is not the undisclosed purpose of
the annexor, but rather the intention implied and manifested by his act." Rayl, 108 Idaho at 528,
700 P.2d at 571. In other words, "intent should be determined from the surrounding
circumstances at the time of installation, and not necessarily from testimony as to the subjective
intent of the installer and his frame of mind at the time of installation." Id. In Rayl, the Court
reiterated "the requirement that courts assess objective intent, annexation, and adaptation to
determine intent." Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259,269,297 P.3d 222,
232 (2012) (emphasis added).
The evidence the district court relied on to find that the Post Falls Landing Marina was
not intended to be permanent can only be described as evidence of Mr. Green's subjective intent.
Indeed, the marina's facilities and improvements were designed, funded, and installed as an
integral part of Post Falls Landing, were used in connection with (and to promote) the
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development, and were connected by utility lines, a fixed pier dock, and a boat ramp. See
Tr.Vol.lat 236:25-239:25; Green Depo. at 14:18-20, 15:13-16, 30:3-31:17; Exs. 3, 20, 21.
Based on those circumstances, the district court found the marina was annexed and adapted to
the Post Falls Landing property. R.Vol.6 at 1197:-98. Again, evidence of annexation and
adaptation "are intended to assist the fact finder in determining the parties' intent." Steel Farms,
154 Idaho at 268, 297 P .3d at 231.
Yet, the district court's finding on intent conflicts with its findings that the marina was
annexed and adapted to the adjoining realty. Turning to the intent test, the district court observed
that Mr. Green "testified at his deposition that he did not necessarily intend for the Marina to be
a permanent amenity of the Post Falls Landing Project." R.Vol.6 at 1998 (emphasis added).

Ultimately the district court found, "Mr. Green's subjective intent that the Marina and its
improvements were not permanent is supported by the fact that the Marina's design was altered

to have only one ramp connection rather than the originally proposed five." 11 Id. (emphasis
added). Because Mr. Green was not a party to this action and had no stake in the marina, Liberty
and WKDT cannot be bound by his subjective intent. Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 34
11

The district court's reference to one ramp connection instead of five relates to The
Point's conceptual design for the Post Falls Landing Marina rendered in the April 2003 "master
plan" for Post Falls Landing. See Ex. 3 at 2. The master plan shows another design for the
marina using two ramp connections. Id. at 3. Ultimately, the marina was constructed with one
ramp connection but also with a fixed pier dock and boat landing platform on the shore. See Exs.
11, 12. The district court's reliance on one ramp versus five as objective evidence to determine
intent makes little sense, particularly when the marina (as constructed) has greater connectivity
to the adjoining realty with the fixed pier dock and boat landing platform than the five ramps
shown in the 2003 master plan. Compare Ex. 3 at 2 with Exs. 11, 12.
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Idaho 385,392,201 P. 717, 719 (1921) (in contest between attaching creditor and mortgagee,
finding "[n]either party was bound by the intention existing in the mind of the owner").
WKDT also cites Estate ofMorgan v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 478,483 (1969), affirmed,
448 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1971), and Wardv. United States, No. 70-1412-CC, 1971 WL 383 (C.D.
Cal. May 25, 1971), for the proposition that floating docks are not fixtures. See RB at 43 n.20.
Neither decision is persuasive authority. Both found floating docks were not "tangible personal
property" (i.e., fixtures) based on provisions of income tax regulations, which express! y provided
that "wharves and docks ... are not tangible personal property." Estate of Morgan, 52 T.C. at
482; see Ward, 1971 WL 383, at* 1. Moreover, whether an improvement is a fixture is a caseby-case determination. See, e.g., Steel Farms, 154 Idaho at 268, 297 P.3d at 231. To be sure, in
other circumstances, courts have found a marina is a fixture. 12 See, e.g., Vallerie v. Town of

Stonington, 751 A.2d 829, 830-31 (Conn. 2000) (affirming determination that floating docks and
finger piers were fixtures, and thus constituted realty, for tax purposes).
In the end, the district court gave improper consideration and weight to Mr. Green's

subjective intent, contrary to the Court's instructions in Rayl and Beebe and ultimately to
12

In addition, the United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Idaho issued In re Ryerson,
519 B.R. 275 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2014), shortly after Liberty filed its opening appeal brief. In that
case, the court found a floating dock built adjacent to a personal residence was not a fixture. Id.
at 290-91. The decision is factually distinguishable because the dock was not affixed or annexed
to the land but only attached by a removable ramp. Id. at 291. In contrast, key components of
the Post Falls Landing Marina were physically affixed on or adjacent to land (e.g., utility lines,
underground fuel tanks, the fixed pier dock, and the boat landing platform). See Tr.Vol. I at
237: 16-238: 19; Exs. 11, 12; Green Depo. at 30:3-31: 17. To determine intent, the court in In re
Ryerson also objectively evaluated the circumstances surrounding the dock's installation, rather
than the subjective intent of the installer. 519 B.R. at 290-91.
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Liberty's prejudice. See Rayl, 108 Idaho at 528, 700 P.2d at 571. Considering that evidence, the
district court wrongly applied the three-part test to find the marina was personal property. The
district court's decision that WKDT has a perfected security interest in the marina was legal error
and must be reversed.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Liberty respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
district court's judgment, denial of Liberty's motion for reconsideration, and finding that WKDT
is entitled to priority to Blocks A, D, and E of the Post Falls Landing property. In addition,
Liberty asks the Court to reverse the district court's judgment, denial of Liberty's motion for
reconsideration, and finding that the Post Falls Landing Marina improvements are personal
property and not a fixture.
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